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ABIGAIL ALLIANCE V. VON ESCHENBACH:
RESTRICTING ACCESS TO POTENTIALLY
LIFESAVING DRUGS SINCE 2007
Allison J. Goodman*
Prostate cancer is the most common non-skin cancer among males in the
United States.' More than two million men in the United States have
prostate cancer, and it is estimated that during 2008, approximately 186,320
new cases of prostate cancer will be diagnosed, and 28,660 men will die
from the disease.2  On January 12, 2004, the Dendreon Corporation
announced updated survival data from their Phase III trial3 of Provenge,
Dendreon's investigational immunotherapy that treats advanced stage
prostate cancer.4 The Dendreon Corporation reported that "[p]atients with
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B.A., Emory University, May 2006. The author would like to thank Professor Jennison
and Professor Smith for their helpful comments and advice, as well as the Journal of
Contemporary Health Law and Policy staff for their editorial prowess. The author also
wishes to thank her parents, for everything.
1. NAT'L CANCER INST., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., WHAT YOU
NEED TO KNOw ABOUT PROSTATE CANCER 1 (2005), available at http://www.cancer.gov/
pdf/WYNTK/WYNTKprostate.pdf. Prostate cancer is a disease in which cancer
develops in the prostate, a gland in the male reproductive system located below the
bladder and in front of the rectum. Id. at 2. It occurs when cells of the prostate mutate
and begin to multiply out of control. Id. at 4. These cells may spread (metastasize) from
the prostate to other parts of the body, specifically to the bones and lymph nodes. Id. at
5-6. Prostate cancer may cause pain, difficulty urinating, and erectile dysfunction. Id. at
9.
2. American Cancer Society, What Are the Key Statistics About Prostate Cancer?,
http://www.cancer.org/docroot/CRI/content/CRI2 4 IX What are the keystatistics
fornprostate cancer 36.asp?sitearea= (last visited Oct. 17, 2008). "Prostate cancer
accounts for about 9% of cancer-related deaths in men." Id.
3. See discussion infra Part II.B (explaining that Phase 111 is the final phase of the
New Drug Approval Process).
4. Press Release, Dendreon Corp., Dendreon's Provenge Extends Survival in
Advanced Prostate Cancer by Over Eight Months in Patients with Gleason Scores of
Seven and Less (Jan. 12, 2004), http://investor.dendreon.com/releasedetail.cfm?releaselD
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Gleason Scores5 of seven and less receiving Provenge had a significant
survival advantage, having on average an 89 percent overall increase in their
survival time as compared to [those who received a] placebo.' ' 6 Patients
who received Provenge were able to prolong their survival time by 8.4
months, a survival rate that was 3.7 times higher than patients receiving a
placebo.
8
According to Dr. John M. Corman, Director of the Virginia Mason
Comprehensive Prostate Cancer Clinic and Assistant Clinical Professor of
Urology at the University of Washington in Seattle, "This [was] the longest
survival benefit ever reported in a Phase [II] study in late stage prostate
cancer."9  Dr. Corman was hopeful that "[w]ith the combination of this
=126255&header-IR [hereinafter Dendreon Press Release]. This announcement was
made based on results from the ongoing monitoring of Dendreon's completed Phase III
(D9901) trial. Id. Due to its "forward-looking" nature, it is noted that any statements
made therein are subject to "risks and uncertainties" surrounding "the efficacy of
Provenge to treat men suffering from prostate cancer," "the presentation of data to the
FDA and approval of product applications by the FDA," and finally, those "risks and
uncertainties inherent in the process of discovering, developing, and commercializing
drugs that are safe and effective for use as human therapeutics." Id.
5. National Cancer Institute, Dictionary of Cancer Terms, http://www.cancer.gov/
Templates/dbalpha.aspx?CdrID=45696 (last visited Sept. 30, 2008). A Gleason score is
the grading given to prostate cancer to determine its growth rate. Id. The score is based
on the microscopic appearance of the cancer cells, and how they compare with healthy
cells. Id. The more the appearance of the cells diverge, the more aggressive the cancer,
and the higher the score the cancer receives. Id. The Gleason score ranges from two to
ten, with a Gleason score of two being associated with the best prognosis and a score of
ten with the worst. Id.
6. Dendreon Press Release, supra note 4.
7. Id. Patients receiving Provenge survived for 30.7 months, while those who
received a placebo survived for 22.3 months. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. The results of Dr. Corman's research suggest that "[t]he importance of the
Provenge data . . . is that no previous Phase III study has demonstrated [a] survival
advantage in the treatment of [androgen-independent prostate cancer patients]." In fact,
"[s]everal studies have shown a ... (decline in [prostate-specific antigen level]), but...
no other trial in this patient group has ever shown a survival advantage." Vaccine
Provenge: A New Weapon in Fighting Prostate Cancer, LIFELINE (Prostate Cancer
Support Ass'n of N.M., Albuquerque, N.M.), July 2007, at 5, available at
http://pcsanm.home.att.net/MyHomepageFiles/Download/july2007.pdf.
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exciting new survival data and favorable side effect profile, Provenge
[would have] the potential to change the way we treat prostate cancer in the
future."'10 However, Dr. Corman's prediction has yet to come true; today,
Provenge still awaits approval by the United States Food and Drug
Administration (FDA).
The FDA has refused to accept the results of the Dendreon study because
the Agency's policy does not allow for retrospective analysis of a subgroup
that may have benefited from an experimental drug. 1' Therefore, in order to
gain FDA approval, Dendreon was forced to begin a new study. 12 As of
March 2007, Provenge had performed well in clinical trials, and an FDA
advisory committee recommended that the agency approve the treatment.
1 3
In spite of this recommendation, the FDA denied final approval, stating that
more data was needed. 14 The ramifications of this denial are uncertain and
could mean that Dendreon must restart the approval process, which requires
a minimum three year wait for drug approval. For most, if not all, patients
affected by prostate cancer, three months, let alone three years, is too long to
wait for approval of a drug that could potentially save their lives.
Provenge is not the only drug therapy caught in what critics call the
"byzantine" drug approval process. 15 Thousands of patients die each year
waiting for the approval of investigational drugs.' 6 Although Congress has
10. Dendreon Press Release, supra note 4.
II. William Faloon, FDA Rejects Promising Prostate Cancer Drug, LIFE
EXTENSION, Special Edition 2007, at 2, available at http://www.cancervictor.com/
cancervictor/LECancerSE07LR.pdf.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 3. The FDA Advisory Panel vote was 13-4 in favor of approval. Id.
14. Id. "According to the FDA, however, these 'survival advantages' had 'issues'.
[which] while relevant and important, were superseded by the solid immunology science
behind the product." Id.
15. James Oliphant, A Fight to Give Hope to the Terminally Ill, CHICAGO TRIBUNE,
Aug. 13, 2007 at 1, available at 2007 WL 15620563.
16. Sue Kovach, The Abigail Alliance: Motivated by Tragic Circumstances, Families
Battle an Uncaring Bureaucracy, LIFE EXTENSION, Special Edition 2007, at 26, available
at http://www.cancervictor.com/cancervictor/LECancerSE07LR.pdf (quoting Frank
Burroughs, founder of the Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs, a
non-profit advocacy group).
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attempted to intervene and speed up the approval process,17 the FDA has
worked against its efforts, often delaying the approval of new drugs in the
name of patient safety, perhaps to avoid the backlash caused by a drug
recall.' 8 Additionally, advocates who desire an expedited review process
and expanded access to these drugs may experience even more difficulty,
now that a court of appeals recently decided, en banc, that terminally ill
patients do not have a right to investigational drug therapies.'
9
This Comment will first outline the evolution of the FDA approval
process and discuss current policies that allow for expanded access to
investigational drugs. Second, it will discuss the Abigail Alliance and its
goal to persuade the FDA to allow terminally ill patients access to drugs that
have successfully completed Phase I of the FDA approval process. Third,
this Comment will provide an analysis of the efficacy of early access
programs versus programs that provide for expedited review, and will
explain why, in the wake of the Abigail Alliance litigation, Congress should
pass legislation constituting a hybrid of expanded access and expedited
review. While this legislation would mandate the FDA to take immediate
action to improve this process in order to assist those patients who need
access to potentially life-saving drug therapy, this Comment ultimately
concludes that despite these efforts, the FDA has an incentive to slow down
the drug approval process, and this incentive trumps any Congressional
attempt to regulate otherwise.
I. THE FDA'S FRAMEWORK FOR REGULATING INVESTIGATIONAL DRUGS
A. A History of FDA Regulation During the Twentieth Century
In order to understand the present system of FDA regulation, it is
important to see how this system has evolved over the past century. Before
1906, there was little to no governmental regulation regarding the quality of
medications distributed to the public, and regulations requiring a doctor's
prescription for medications did not exist.
20
17. See discussion infra Part IV.B. 1.
18. See generally The Independent Institute, Why the FDA Has an Incentive to Delay
the Introduction of New Drugs, http://www.fdareview.org/incentives.shtml (last visited
Oct. 17, 2008).
19. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach,
495 F.3d 695, 697 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
20. Wallace F. Janssen, Outline of the History of U.S. Drug Regulation and
Labeling, 36 FOOD DRUG COsM. L.J. 420, 421-22 (1981). "Patent" medications, many
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By the twentieth century, it became apparent that some form of drug
regulation was necessary. In 1906, Congress enacted the Pure Food and
Drugs Act.2' This law targeted the false and fraudulent "patent ' 22 medicines
by requiring that new drugs meet standards of strength, quality, and purity.
23
Unfortunately, the 1906 Act was difficult to enforce and was narrowly
24applied. This, along with public outcry regarding the disastrous "Elixer
Sulfanilamide Incident,"25 prompted Congress to pass a more stringent drug
containing poisonous, toxic or highly addictive ingredients, were advertised with
outlandish health claims and widely marketed throughout the United States. Id. at 422.
21. Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768, repealed by 21 U.S.C.
§ 329(a) (1938).
22. See note 20 supra.
23. Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768, § 7. A few years later,
this Act was extended to cover not only a ban on false or misleading labeling pertaining
to ingredients, but also to address false claims of effectiveness intended to defraud
consumers. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, History of the FDA -The 1906 Food
and Drug Act and Its Enforcement, http://www.fda.gov/oc/historylhistoryoffda/
section l.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2008).
24. Id. "Separate laws established standards for some specific foods, such as apples
and butter, as well as for canned food," however, the laws and standards were not
uniform, leading courts to apply the standards differently in each case. Id. Additionally,
"[w]hile the law was much clearer about drug standards than standards for foods,
misbranding was the source of considerable controversy in the regulation of drugs." Id.
25. Carol Ballentine, Taste of Raspberries, Taste of Death: The 1937 Elixir
Sulfanilamide Incident, FDA CONSUMER, June 1981, at 18, available at
http://www.fda.gov/oc/history/elixir.html. In 1937, over 100 people died from the FDA
approved medicine marketed as "Elixir Sulfanilamide." Id. This drug, which was used
to treat streptococcal infections, was prepared using a chemical called diethylene glycol.
Id. Unbeknownst to the manufacturer, however, diethylene glycol is poisonous to
humans. Id. Although simple animal testing would have revealed the drug's toxicity, no
such testing was performed prior to the drug's release because, at the time, there were no
regulations requiring pre-market safety testing of new drugs. Id. at 21. The manufacturer
technically violated the 1906 Act because the product was "misbranded" as an elixir,
which by definition contains alcohol, and this product did not; however, the company's
failures to test the product for safety and label it adequately were not violations of the
law. Id.
2008
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law.26 The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 ("FDCA)
27
required manufacturers to prove the safety of drugs, authorized factory
inspections, and established penalties for fraudulent claims and misleading
labels.
28
In 1951, the FDCA was amended to formally distinguish between
prescription and over-the-counter medications. 29 Referred to as the Durham-
Humphrey Amendment, this was the first federal law requiring a physician's
prescription for drugs deemed unsafe for self-medication.
30
In the late 1950's, reports of birth defects in European nations caused by
thalidomide, a sleeping pill on the verge of being introduced in the United
26. Peter M. Currie, Restricting Access to Unapproved Drugs: A Compelling
Government Interest?, 20 J.L. & HEALTH 309, 311 (2006-07).
27. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (2000)).
28. 52 Stat. 1040 (1938). The 1938 Act compelled manufacturers to demonstrate to
the FDA the safety of new drugs prior to marketing. Id. § 505(i). The Act also allowed
the FDA to inspect manufacturing facilities. Id. § 702(a). Furthermore the Act extended
FDA regulation to color additives and cosmetics. Id. § 604. The Act permitted the FDA
to seek injunctions from courts. Id. § 303. Finally, the Act provided detailed legal
definitions of drug, devices, cosmetics, and labeling. Id. § 201.
29. 21 U.S.C. § 353 (2000). This law requires a prescription for any drug that is
unsafe to use without supervision, has a high risk of dependency, or is applied for under a
prescription drug application. All other drugs are considered "nonprescription."
Matthew J. Seamon, Plan Bfor the FDA: A Need for a Third Class of Drug Regulation in
the United States Involving a "Pharmacist-Only" Class of Drugs, 12 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 521, 539 (2006). "The original requirement of a prescription for all
potentially addictive drugs, 21 U.S.C. § 352(d), was repealed by Pub. L. No. 105-115 on
Nov. 21, 1997." Id. at 539 n.158. Until that time, all drugs could be purchased over-the-
counter by consumers. Id. at 539-40. The 1951 amendments required that prescription
drugs contain warnings that they could only be legally dispensed with the authorization
of a health professional. See id. at 539. The drug must bear, at a minimum, the symbol
"Rx only." 21 U.S.C. §353 (b)(4)(A).
30. Seamon, supra note 29, at 539; Durham-Humphrey Drug Prescriptions Act, Pub.
L. No. 82-215, 65 Stat. 648 (1951). "These amendments were named after Democratic
Senator Hubert Humphrey from Minnesota, who was later Vice President to Lyndon B.
Johnson, and Democratic Congressman Carl Durham from North Carolina, both
pharmacists." Seamon, supra note 29, at 539 n.156.
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States, highlighted the need for more FDA regulation. 31 In response to this
tragedy, the Kefauver-Harris Amendments of 1962 mandated that
manufacturers prove that their drugs were both effective for specific medical
purposes, and safe for human consumption, through "adequate and well-
controlled" studies.
32
B. The Approval Process for a New Drug
Today, the average experimental drug in the United States will spend
twelve years being tested before it is finally approved for distribution. 33 Out
of the five thousand compounds that make it to preclinical testing, only five
will be tested on humans, and of these five, only one will ultimately be
approved for consumer use.
3 4
31. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Time Line: Chronology of Drug
Administration in the United States http://www.fda.gov/Cder/about/history/timel.htm
[hereinafter Time Line] (last visited Oct. 17, 2008). In the late 1950's, the sedative
Thalidomide was prescribed to treat morning sickness in pregnant women. U.S. Food
and Drug Administration, Thalidomide - Important Patient Information, http://www.fda.
gov/cder/news/thalidomide.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2008). Soon, however, it was
discovered that thousands of babies were born with severe birth defects because their
mothers had taken the drug during pregnancy. Id. Today, the FDA has approved
thalidomide to treat the lesions associated with what is commonly known as leprosy.
U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Thalidomide Information, FDA Announces
Approval of Drug for Hansen's Disease (Leprosy) Side Effect; Imposes Unprecedented
Authority to Restrict Distribution, http://www.fda.gov/cder/news/thalinfo/default.htm
(last visited Oct. 17, 2008). However, due to the high rate of birth defects found in
infants born by women who took thalidomide while pregnant, the FDA established
extremely tight controls concerning thalidomide's distribution in the United States. Id.
32. Time Line, supra note 31; Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, §
102, 76 Stat. 780, 780-82 (1962). This law applied retroactively to all drugs introduced
since the 1938 FDC Act. Id. The FDA required firms to report all adverse reactions to
the FDA and to include complete information regarding these adverse effects. Id. For
the first time, it was required to obtain informed consent from patients participating in
clinical studies. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 103, 76 Stat. 780,
782-84 (1962).
33. Dale E. Wierenga & C. Robert Eaton, Development Process, Avanir
Pharmaceuticals, http://www.avanir.com/product/development.php (last visited Oct, 18,
2008) [hereinafter Avanir Chart].
34. Id. For example, research was initially done on Retrovir (zidovudine, also
known as AZT) in the 1960's to determine whether it would be a successful anti-cancer
drug. Michelle Meadows, The FDA's Drug Review Process: Ensuring Drugs are Safe
2008
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The development of a new drug begins with the "Preclinical Testing"
stage. 35 This three-and-a-half year period consists of laboratory testing and
animal studies. 36 The ultimate purpose of the Preclinical Testing stage is to
determine whether the biological activity of the compound is successful
against the targeted disease. 37 During this time, the compound is also
evaluated for safety. 38  Most drugs, however, do not pass the Preclinical
Testing stage.3 9
If the compound passes the Preclinical Testing stage, the sponsoring
company4 ° files an Investigational New Drug ("IND") Application with the
FDA, requesting permission to begin human testing.4 1 The 1ND Application
and Effective, FDA CONSUMER, Jul.-Aug. 2002, at 19, available at http://www.fda.gov/
fdac/features/2002/402 drug.htmI [hereinafter FDA CONSUMER]. However, it received
only disappointing results. Id. Twenty years later, researchers found that the drug could
be used to treat AIDS, and in 1987, the Food and Drug Administration approved the drug
for that purpose. Id.
35. Avanir Chart, supra note 33; FDA CONSUMER, supra note 34, at 19.
36. Avanir Chart, supra note 33.
37. Id.
38. Id.; FDA CONSUMER, supra note 34, at 19.
39. FDA CONSUMER, supra note 34, at 19.
40. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Information for Sponsor-Investigators Submitting
Investigational New Drug Applications (1NDs), http://www.fda.gov/CDER/forms/1571-
1572-help.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2008). The "sponsor" is the entity that is
accountable for and begins a clinical investigation. Id. "The sponsor may be a
pharmaceutical company, a private or academic organization, or an individual." Id. In
contrast, a "Sponsor-Investigator is an individual who both initiates and conducts a
clinical investigation and under whose immediate direction the investigational drug is
being administered or dispensed." Id. For administrative reasons, the FDA recommends
that only one individual be designated as the sponsor. Id. "If a pharmaceutical company
will be supplying the drug, but will not itself be submitting the IND, the company is not
the sponsor." Id.
41. Avanir Chart, supra note 33. The IND must include the names of parties
responsible for the investigation, a statement of the investigational plan, a statement of
the name of the drug to be tested and all of its active ingredients, a summary of any past
human experience with the drug, a description of the overall plan for investigation, the
identification of phases of clinical investigation, a list of possible risks and side effects, a
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must include the results of preclinical testing,42 how the sponsor proposes to
carry out the human testing,4 3 and information regarding the compound
itself.44  The IND Application must also be submitted to the local
institutional review board ("IRB") for review.45 If the FDA does not reject
the IND within thirty days, it is automatically approved. 46 Once the IND
Application is approved, the sponsor may begin the three-phase clinical
experimentation process involving human subjects.4 7
Phase I of the approval process consists of "tests [that] study a drug's
safety profile, including the safe dosage range. These studies also determine
how a drug is absorbed, distributed, metabolized, and excreted [as well as]
the duration of its action. ' 4s Phase I testing requires approximately one year
protocol for each planned study, and a summary of pharmacological and toxicological
effects of the drug on animals. 21 C.F.R. § 312.23 (2008).
42. Avanir Chart, supra note 33. The results must include whether any toxic effects
were found in the animal studies. Id.
43. Id. The proposal must include how, where, and on whom the new studies will be
conducted. Id.
44. Id. The information provided to the FDA must include the chemical make-up of
the drug, the way that the drug is believed to work inside the human body, and the
method by which the drug will be produced. Id.
45. Avanir Chart, supra note 33. "The board is a panel of scientists and non-
scientists in hospitals and research institutions that oversees clinical research." FDA
CONSUMER, supra note 34, at 19.
46. Avanir Chart, supra note 33. Additionally, annual progress reports regarding the
clinical trials must be submitted to the FDA. Id.
47. See generally 21 C.F.R. § 312.21 (2007). Completion of this three-step process
is mandatory for final FDA approval of the drug. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2000).
48. Avanir Chart, supra note 33. See also FDA CONSUMER, supra note 34, at 19; 21
C.F.R. § 3 12.21 (a) which states that:
Phase 1 studies . . . are designed to determine the metabolism and
pharmacologic actions of the drug in humans, the side effects associated with
increasing doses, and, if possible, to gain early evidence on effectiveness.
During Phase 1, sufficient information about the drug's pharmacokinetics and
pharmacological effects should be obtained to permit the design of well-
controlled, scientifically valid, Phase 2 studies.
2008
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to complete, and generally involves twenty to eighty normal, healthy
volunteers.4 9
If the results of Phase I clinical trials indicate that the drug may be safe,
the drug then proceeds to Phase 11.50 Phase II determines the safety and
efficacy of the drug through a process of controlled studies involving
approximately one hundred to three hundred volunteer patients.5 1  The
clinical trials held during Phase II last for approximately two years.
52
If the results of the Phase II trials look promising, the drug then moves
onto Phase 111.53 This final phase54 lasts for approximately three years and
usually involves one thousand to three thousand volunteer patients in clinics
49. Avanir Chart, supra note 33; see also 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(a)(1) ("The total
number of subjects and patients included in Phase 1 studies varies with the drug, but is
generally in the range of 20 to 80."); FDA CONSUMER, supra note 34, at 19.
50. FDA CONSUMER, supra note 34, at 19. "Phase 2 includes the controlled clinical
studies conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of the drug for a particular indication or
indications in patients with the disease or condition under study and to determine the
common short-term side effects and risks associated with the drug." 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(b).
51. Avanir Chart, supra note 33, at 2; FDA CONSUMER, supra note 34, at 19. Unlike
Phase I volunteers, Phase II volunteers are people suffering from the disease or condition
that the drug has been designed to treat. Avanir Chart, supra note 33, at 2.
52. Avanir Chart, supra note 33.
53. FDA CONSUMER, supra note 34, at 19; see also 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(c) ("[Trials]
are performed after preliminary evidence suggesting effectiveness of the drug has been
obtained, and are intended to gather the additional information about effectiveness and
safety that is needed to evaluate the overall benefit-risk relationship of the drug and to
provide an adequate basis for physician labeling.").
54. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.21 (listing Phase III as the final phase of drug investigation).
"For some medicines, the FDA requires additional studies (Phase IV), to evaluate long-
term effects." Avanir Chart, supra note 33, at 2. Known as Phase IV, the phase
involves the safety surveillance and ongoing technical support of a drug after it
receives permission to be sold. This phase is conducted over a much larger
patient population and for a longer duration than all the earlier three stages. It is
designed to detect any rare or long-term adverse effects.
Clinical Research Education and Management Academy, About Clinical Research,
http://www.cremaindia.org/index.php?option=com-content&view=article&id= 18&Itemi
d 20 (last visited Oct. 17, 2008).
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and hospitals. 55 Physicians closely monitor the patients to determine the
drug's efficacy on their particular conditions, and to identify any adverse
reactions in these patients. 
5 6
The company that sponsored the IND application will evaluate the results
of the data once all three phases of the clinical trials have been completed.57
If the clinical trial data successfully demonstrates safety and effectiveness,
the pharmaceutical company files a New Drug Application ("NDA") with
the FDA.58 The FDA requires that the NDA contain all of the scientific
information that the sponsor gathered through the preclinical and clinical
trials. 59 A typical NDA usually exceeds 100,000 pages. 60 By law, the FDA
should review an NDA within six months; 61 however, in almost all cases, the
period between the first submission of an NDA and final FDA approval
exceeds that limit.
62
Once the FDA approves the NDA, the new medicine becomes available
for physicians to prescribe.63  However, despite the medication's FDA
approval and availability, the FDA requires the pharmaceutical company to
continually submit reports that include instances of adverse reactions to the
medication, as well as certain "quality-control" records. 64  For some
55. Avanir Chart, supra note 33; see also FDA CONSUMER, supra note 34, at 19.
56. Avanir Chart, supra note 33.
57. Id.
58. FDA CONSUMER, supra note 34, at 19.
59. E.g., Avanir Chart, supra note 33; see also 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(A) (2000)
(requiring that the NDA contain data demonstrating "whether or not such drug is safe for
use and whether such drug is effective.").
60. Avanir Chart, supra note 33.
61. 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(1); see also Avanir Chart, supra note 36; FDA CONSUMER,
supra note 37, at 19.
62. Avanir Chart, supra note 33. For example, in 1992, the average NDA review
time was 29.9 months. Id.
63. Id. FDA approval is premised upon physicians prescribing the drug for "on-
label" purposes stipulated by the drug's sponsor. Currie, supra note 26, at 313.
64. Avanir Chart, supra note 33.
2008
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medications, the FDA requires additional studies65 to evaluate their long-
term effects.
66
C. The Early Access Programs Currently Available Are Insufficient
Discovering and developing a safe and effective new medication is a long,
difficult, and expensive process. 6v This process can be frustrating for any
patient with a debilitating illness, but terminally ill patients could, and often
do, die waiting for a drug's approval. However, under the current system,
terminally ill patients are not completely without recourse. Under the FDA,
there are several mechanisms available that allow terminally ill patients to
gain early access to investigational drug therapies that have not yet cleared
the FDA's substantial system of regulation.
68
The first of these programs is the "Treatment IND" provision, which the
FDA enacted in 1987 to make promising INDs available, as early in the drug
development process as possible, to desperately ill patients. The FDA
permits an investigational drug to be used under a Treatment IND if
preliminary evidence of the drug's efficacy exists, and (i) the drug is
intended to treat a serious or life-threatening disease; 7° (ii) there is no
alternative drug or therapy available to treat that stage of the disease in the
intended individuals; (iii) the drug is currently under investigation in a
65. 21 C.F.R. § 312.85 (2007) ("These studies could include, but would not be
limited to, studying different doses or schedules of administration than were used in
phase [Il] studies, use of the drug in other patient populations or other stages of the
disease, or use of the drug over a longer period of time.").
66. See FDA Consumer, supra note 34, at 19.
67. Avanir Chart, supra note 33. In 1993, the Congressional Office of Technology
Assessment reported that "it costs a [drug] company $359 million to get one new
medicine from the laboratory to the pharmacist's shelf." Id.
68. Leif N. Furmansky, Just Say No to Drugs: The Abigail Alliance and the
Attempted Abolition of the Food and Drug Administration, 26 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP.
108, 110 (2007).
69. Currie, supra note 26, at 314.
70. 21 C.F.R. § 312.34(b)(1) (2007). "[A]n 'immediately life-threatening' disease
means a stage of a disease in which there is a reasonable likelihood that death will occur
within a matter of months or in which premature death is likely without early
treatment." 21 C.F.R. § 312.34(b)(3)(B)(ii).
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controlled clinical trial, or was involved in a completed IND clinical trial;
71and (iv) the sponsor of the IND is actively pursuing market approval.
Treatment INDs are made available to patients before general marketing
begins. Typically, patients can begin receiving these drugs during Phase III;
however, some patients may be granted access as early as Phase II clinical
72trials. Ordinarily, Treatment INDs are not distributed before Phase I, even
to treat an immediately life-threatening illness.7 3  Treatment INDs also
benefit the FDA by allowing them to obtain additional data regarding the
drug's safety and effectiveness prior to approval. Unfortunately, however,
Treatment INDs are rarely granted; from 1987-1999, only thirty-nine
applications were approved.74 Cancer and HIV/AIDS treatments accounted
for a substantial number of the approved INDs.75
Although the Treatment IND program is available for all experimental
drug therapies that could be effective against any serious or life-threatening
disease, the FDA and the National Cancer Institute (NCI) established the
"Group C Treatment IND" as a means of distributing investigational drugs
that are specifically designed to treat cancer. 76 The National Institutes of
Health exclusively distribute Group C drugs to oncologists under NCI.... 77
protocols outside controlled clinical trials. Group C drugs are generally
71. 21 C.F.R. § 312.34(b)(1). The four requirements severely limit Treatment lND
availability. See FierceBiotech, Treatment IND News, http://www.fiercebiotech.com/
topics/treatment IND.asp (last visited Oct. 18, 2008).
72. 21 C.F.R. § 312.34(a) ("In the case of a serious disease, a drug ordinarily may be
made available for treatment use under this section during Phase [III] investigations or
after all clinical trials have been completed; however, in appropriate circumstances, a
drug may be made available for treatment use during Phase [II].").
73. Id. "In the case of an immediately life-threatening disease, a drug may be made
available for treatment use under this section earlier than Phase [III], but ordinarily not
earlier than Phase [II]." Id.
74. FierceBiotech, supra note 71.
75. Id.
76. Currie, supra note 26, at 314-15.
77. Id. Generally, properly trained physicians can administer the drugs without the
need for specialized supportive care facilities. Id. at 315. Although treatment is the
primary objective, and patients treated under Group C guidelines are not part of a clinical
trial, safety and effectiveness data are collected. Id. "Because administration of Group C
drugs is not done with research intent, FDA has generally granted a waiver from the IRB
2008
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Phase III drugs that have shown evidence of "relative and reproducible
efficacy in a specific tumor type. ' 8
Similar to Group C, the U.S. Public Health Service developed the
"Parallel Track" program in response to the AIDS epidemic to permit wider
availability of experimental drugs developed to treat HIV and AIDS.
Under this policy, patients with AIDS who are unable to participate in
controlled clinical trials can receive investigational drugs shown to be
promising by preliminary studies.8s Under the Parallel Track Program, HIV
and AIDS patients may access investigational drugs earlier in the
development process than the Treatment IND program allows.
8'
Unfortunately, procedural requirements must be met before experimental
drugs can be made available under the above-mentioned programs.
Recognizing this issue, the FDA authorizes the shipment of experimental
drugs during emergencies where compliance with IND procedures is
impracticable. 82 However, authorization for an "Emergency Use IND" isnot without procedural red tape. According to the statute, "[e]xcept in
review requirements." U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Guidance for Institutional
Review Boards and Clinical Investigators: 1998 Update, http://www.fda.gov/oc/
ohrt/irbs/drugsbiologics.html#treatment (last visited Oct. 18, 2008) [hereinafter FDA
Guidance 1998] (citation omitted).
78. FDA Guidance 1998, supra note 77.
79. Expanded Availability of Investigational New Drugs Through a Parallel Track
Mechanism for People With AIDS and Other HIV-Related Disease, 57 Fed. Reg. 13250
(Apr. 15, 1992).
80. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Expanded Access and Expedited Approval
of New Therapies Related to HIV/AIDS, http://www.fda.gov/oashi/aids/expanded.html
(last visited Oct. 17, 2008).
81. Id. Stavudine is the only drug to date that has been submitted for consideration
under the parallel track policy. Id. In 1992, approximately 12,000 patients received
Stavudine through the parallel track program. Id. Less then two years later, an
accelerated new drug application for the drug was approved. Id. Stavudine received full
marketing approval on December 21, 1995. Id.
82. 21 C.F.R. § 312.36 (2008). For instance, with regard to Treatment INDs, while
"[p]atient advocates and healthcare activists often push for companies to apply for
Treatment INDs when they think a new drug may hold some promise to cure or treat a
disease," the Treatment IND system is not perfect. FierceBiotech, supra note 71. The
rigorous FDA approval process and lack of insurance coverage for experimental
treatments result in an expensive and frustrating system for patients. Id.
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extraordinary circumstances, such authorization will be conditioned upon the
sponsor making an appropriate IND submission as soon as practicable after
receiving the authorization.
83
Due to the restrictions and complications associated with receiving early
access under these programs,84 the Abigail Alliance, a patient rights group
discussed below, contends that these reforms are insufficient. Accordingly,
the Abigail Alliance sued the FDA to obtain better access to potentially
lifesaving drug treatments,85 and is now working to pass legislation "that
will remove the regulatory barriers currently preventing seriously ill patients
from gaining early access to developmental drugs showing efficacy in
clinical trials."
8 6
iI. THE ABIGAIL ALLIANCE CASE AND THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
The Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs (Abigail
Alliance) is a non-profit organization, and its mission is "to help cancer
patients and others with life threatening illnesses."87  The Abigail Alliance
83. 21 C.F.R. § 312.36.
84. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.34(b)(3). For example, the FDA reserves the right to deny
any treatment IND request if: (1) the agency believes there is no "reasonable basis" to
conclude the drug was effective; or (2) granting the request "[w]ould ... expose the
patient[s] ... to an unreasonable and significant additional risk of illness of injury." Id
See also, 21 C.F.R. § 312.36 (stating limitations on the emergency use IND).
85. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. McClellan, No.
03-1601, 2004 WL 3777340, slip op. at *2 (D.D.C. 2004) [hereinafter Alliance I] rev'd
Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs and Washington Legal
Found. v. von Eschenbach, 445 F.3d 470 (D.C. Cir. 2006), vacated, 469 F.3d 129 (D.C.
Cir. 2006) [hereinafter Alliance I1], rev'd en banc, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
[hereinafter Alliance III], cert. denied, 128 S.Ct. 1069 (2008).
86. Kovach, supra note 16, at 25.
87. The Abigail Alliance Mission, http://www.abigail-alliance.org/mission.htm (last
visited Oct. 17, 2008). The Abigail Alliance sought to accomplish this mission by suing
the FDA to "provide[] a right of access to experimental drugs for its members." Alliance
Ili, 495 F.3d at 699. Their argument on appeal to the Supreme Court was that:
The Due Process Clause protects the right of a terminally ill patient with no
remaining approved treatment options to attempt to save her own life by
deciding, in consultation with her own doctor, whether to seek access to
investigational medications that the Food and Drug Administration concedes are
safe and promising enough for substantial human testing."
2008
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is named after Abigail Burroughs, a college student who passed away from
head and neck cancer in 2001.88 Shortly after her diagnosis in 1999, her
family learned about an investigational cancer drug, Erbitux. 9 However,
Abigail was not eligible to participate in the clinical trial, and the FDA
denied her access, despite her tragic circumstances. 90  Shortly after her
death, her father, Frank Burroughs, started the Abigail Alliance.
91
In 2003, the Alliance began petitioning the FDA to amend the IND
process to allow terminally ill patients access to drugs that, have passed
Phase I of the testing process.9' The FDA rejected this petition, and in
response, the Alliance filed a Citizen Petition pursuant to title 21, section
10.30 of the Code of Federal Regulations. 93  Because the FDA did not
respond to this petition within 180 days, the Alliance was granted a right to
judicial review. 94 Subsequently, the Alliance sued the FDA Commissioner
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Abigail Alliance, available at http://www.wlf.org/upload/
09-28-07Abigail%20ceriorari%20petition.pdf.
88. Judy Foreman, Parents Fight for Experimental Drugs, Sept. 23, 2003,
http://www.myhealthsense.com/F030923 expermiimentalDrugs.html.
89. Kovach, supra note 16, at 26.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See generally Citizen Petition of the Abigail Alliance and the Washington Legal
Foundation to the Food and Drug Administration Department of Health and Human
Services, In re Tier I Initial Approval Program to Expedite the Availability of Life-
Saving Drugs (June 11, 2003), http://www.abigail-alliance.org/WLFFDA.pdf
[hereinafter Citizen Petition]. The Washington Legal Foundation "want[s] the FDA to
create a new level of review called Tier 1 Initial Approval." Foreman, supra note 88.
"Under this plan, patients would be able to get an experimental drug if it drug [sic] has
passed Phase I trials, if the patient has been rejected from clinical trials of the drug, and if
nothing else has worked." Id. "Perhaps most controversially, they also want to allow
patients to be allowed to pay manufacturers for these minimally-tested medications." Id.
93. Alliance 1, 2004 WL 3777340, slip op. at *2. A Citizen's Petition is a
mechanism through which the agency is formally asked to take a particular course of
action. 21 C.F.R. § 10.25 (2007).
94. Alliancel, 2004 WL 3777340, slip op. at *2; see 21 C.F.R. § 10.30(e)(2) (2007).
The statute states that:
Abigail Alliance v. Von Eschenbach
and the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services to enjoin
the FDA from continuing to bar the distribution of drus that have passed
Phase I of the approval process to terminally ill patients.
The FDA then filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted with the D.C. District Court.9 6  The court
granted the motion, holding that the Alliance sought the creation of a new
[t]he Commissioner shall furnish a response to each petitioner within 180 days
of receipt of the petition. The response will either: (i) Approve the petition, in
which case the Commissioner shall concurrently take appropriate action (e.g.,
publication of a FEDERAL REGISTER notice) implementing the approval: (ii)
Deny the petition: or (iii) Provide a tentative response, indicating why the
agency has been unable to reach a decision on the petition, e.g., because of the
existence of other agency priorities, or a need for additional information. The
tentative response may also indicate the likely ultimate agency response, and
may specify when a final response may be furnished.
Id.
95. Alliance 1, 2004 WL 3777340, slip op. at *2.
The plaintiffs filed this action on July 28, 2003 to enjoin the defendants from enforcing
the FDA's policy of barring unapproved drugs from interstate commerce, insofar as it has
the effect of prohibiting terminally ill patients with no other treatment options from
purchasing investigational drugs. Specifically, the plaintiffs challenge the policy of
barring the sale of investigational drugs 'showing initial evidence of safety and efficacy
in clinical trials.' The plaintiffs claim that because of the FDA's prohibition on for-profit
sale of drugs in 'compassionate use' programs, drug sponsors are disinclined to
participate sufficiently to meet the demands of more than just 'a fraction of those in
desperate need.' The plaintiffs assert that this policy violates terminally ill patients'
constitutional privacy and liberty rights, as well as their due process rights to life.
Id.
96. Id. The Abigail Alliance contended that FDA restrictions on sales ofunapproved
investigational new drugs violate the plaintiffs' rights to privacy and liberty and deprive
them of life without due process in violation of the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments to
the U.S. Constitution; the defendants, however, argued there is, in fact, no constitutional
right, whether based on privacy, liberty, or due process grounds, that provides terminally
ill patients with access to unapproved drugs or treatment. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment at 2, Abigail Alliance for Better Access to
Developmental Drugs v. McClellan, No. 03-1601 (D.D.C. 2004), 2004 WL 3777340;
Defendants also argued that the restrictions on the sale of unapproved drugs contained in
the governing statute and in FDA regulations and policy are legitimate exercises of the
government's interest in protecting public health. Id. Based on these two arguments, the
defendants argued that the court should dismiss Abigail Alliance's complaint for failure
to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P. Id.
2008
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constitutional right not explicitly guaranteed by the Due Process Clause.
97
Because a due process protection did not exist, the court upheld the FDA's
policy as "rationally related to a legitimate government interest." 98  The
Alliance appealed. 99
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed the district
court's ruling, holding "that where there are no alternative government-
approved treatment options, a terminally ill, mentally competent adult
patient's informed access to potentially life-saving investigational new drugs
determined by the FDA after Phase I trials to be sufficiently safe for
expanded human trials warrants protection under the Due Process
97. Alliance , 2004 WL 3777340, slip op. at 9.
The court [was] not persuaded that the plaintiffs [sought] a recognized right
[because] [w]hile the due process clause clearly states the rights of life and
liberty, and courts have recognized the right to privacy, the plaintiffs
propose[d] a novel interpretation of the due process clause[,] [and] [n]o court
whose authority binds [the D.C. District Court] has ever extended the due
process clause to cover a terminally ill patient's right to receive medical
treatment.
Id. Furthermore, the District Court rejected the authority cited by the plaintiffs as
binding, stating that those cases were not directly on point. Id
98. Id. at 11. Under the rational basis test, the challenged action "need not be in
every respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional. It is enough that
there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular
legislative measure was a rational way to correct it." Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla.
Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955).
99. Alliance II, 445 F.3d 470 (D.C. Cir. 2006), vacated, 469 F.3d 129 (D.C. Cir.
2006). On appeal, the Abigail Alliance argued that the district court wrongly believed
that this court's decision in Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding
that private, consensual, homosexual conduct is not constitutionally protected),
"precluded it from holding that terminally ill patients have a fundamental right to
autonomy and privacy that encompasses this case" because
[t]o the extent Dronenburg ever suggested that the Supreme Court's right-to-
privacy cases were too unprincipled to be applied by the lower federal courts in
new settings, any such holding has been fatally undermined by decisions of this
Court and the Supreme Court over the past twenty years .... The power and
duty to interpret the Constitution in new circumstances cannot be limited to the
United States Supreme Court. It is an aspect of the judicial power itself, inherent
in the duty of every federal court to say what the law is in any case properly
before it.
Brief of Appellants at 15-16, Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs
v. von Eschenbach, 445 F.3d 470 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (No. 04-5350).
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Clause."1 °° The FDA filed a petition for rehearing, and the court of appeals
granted the rehearing en banc. 
°0
The en banc District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals decided 8-2
against the Abigail Alliance, reversing the previous panel's decision, and
upholding the district court's decision that terminally ill patients do not have
a constitutional right to unapproved drugs. 102 The court reached this
conclusion by finding "that there is no fundamental right [protected by the
Due Process Clause] 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition' of
access to experimental drugs for the terminally ill."103 Judge Judith Rogers
and Chief Judge Douglas Ginsburg dissented. 1° 4 At the end of the majority
opinion, however, Judge Griffith noted that the Alliance's arguments are
perhaps better suited for the legislature, stating that "[o]ur Nation's history
and traditions have consistently demonstrated that the democratic branches
100. Alliance II, 445 F.3d at 471 (applying the Supreme Court's analysis in
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
101. Alliance 11I, 495 F.3d 695, 701 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S.Ct. 1069
(2008).
102. Id. at 713-14.
103. Id. at 697 (citation omitted).
104. Id. at 714 (Rogers, J., dissenting). The dissent argues that:
[t]he court's opinion reflects a flawed conception of the right claimed by the
Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs and a stunning
misunderstanding of the stakes. The court shifts the inquiry required by
Washington v. Glucksberg by changing the nature of the right, by conflating the
right with the deprivation, and by prematurely advancing countervailing
government interests. The court fails to come to grips with the Nation's history
and traditions, which reflect deep respect and protection for the right to preserve
life, a corollary to the right to life enshrined in the Constitution. The court
confuses this liberty interest with the manner in which the Alliance alleges that
the liberty has been deprived, namely by denying terminally ill patients access to
investigational medications under the narrow conditions described by the
Alliance. The court conflates the inquiry as to whether a fundamental right exists
at all with whether the government has demonstrated a compelling interest, when
strictly scrutinized, rendering its restrictive policy constitutional.
Id. (citation omitted).
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are better suited to decide the proper balance between the uncertain risks and
benefits of medical technology, and are entitled to deference in doing so."'
' 05
On September 28, 2007, the Washington Legal Foundation ("WLF")
asked the United States Supreme Court ("Supreme Court") to review the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit's en
banc ruling. 1° 6 Because the Supreme Court denied certiorari, the Court of
Appeals' decision stands as the law.' 0 7 Therefore, a more effective path for
drug accessibility advocates might be to pursue additional legislation that
would clarify and correct the FDA's considerations for expedited review. 1
08
III. POTENTIAL LEGISLATION: EARLY ACCESS VERSUS EXPEDITED REVIEW
Because the Supreme Court denied certiorari, the en banc decision has the
potential to radically alter the conduct of clinical cancer research. Judge
Griffith's opinion clearly suggests that the legislature should take action in
order to allow terminally ill patients access to these potentially lifesaving
treatments. °9 Congress will likely have to choose between two options:
allowing access to drugs that have completed Phase I of the [ND approval
process, or accelerating the approval process as a whole.
105. Id. at 713 (majority opinion). Judge Griffith cites the Supreme Court's decision
in Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 30 (1905), stating that:
[w]e must assume that, when the statute in question was passed, the legislature
• . . was not unaware of these opposing theories, and was compelled, of
necessity, to choose between them. It was not compelled to commit a matter
involving the public health and safety to the final decision of a court or jury. It
is no part of the function of a court or a jury to determine which one of two
modes was likely to be the most effective for the protection of the public against
disease.
Id.
106. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Abigail Alliance for Better Access to
Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 128 S.Ct. 1069 (2008) (No. 07-444).
107. Alliance II, cert. denied, 128 S.Ct. 1069 (2008).
108. For further discussion on why the political process would be a better avenue to
effect change in the approval process, see Linda Katherine Leibfarth, Giving the
Terminally Ill Their Due (Process): A Case for Expanded Access to Experimental Drugs
Through the Political Process, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1281, 1316 (2008).
109. See note 106 supra.
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A. The Problems Presented By Early Access
The initial court of appeals' ruling presented the concern that granting
terminally ill patients access to experimental drugs that have passed only
Phase I of the clinical trial process would leave little incentive for these
drugs to enter Phase 1I and Phase III clinical trials, thereby threatening the
entire clinical trial enterprise. 110 To explain why this so, it is necessary to
describe the FDA required clinical testing process in more detail.
The FDA's mandatory clinical trials
i l l are "double-blind" experiments.' 
12
In a double-blind experiment, the patients are divided into two groups: a
"control group" and an "experimental group.""11 3 While the control roup
receives the placebo, 114 the experimental group is given the IND.' 5 To
determine the effect of the drug, the experimental group patients are then
compared to the control group patients.16 To ensure the accuracy of the
results, neither the investigator nor the patients know which groups are given
the medication, and which groups are given the placebo.
117
Allowing terminally ill patients access to drugs that have only completed
Phase I trials is problematic; for example, there would be little incentive for
patients to participate in Phase II and III clinical trials when they would run
the risk of receiving a placebo, as opposed to the actual medication."' This
110. Furmansky, supra note 68, at 112-14; Brief for the American Society of Clinical
Oncology et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellees at 19-22, Abigail Alliance v.
Von Eschenbach, 497 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (No. 04-5350).
111. See discussion supra Part I.B.
112. Furmansky, supra note 68, at 112.
113. Id.
114. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY, 1501 (28th ed. 2006). A placebo is a
treatment that looks identical to the experimental drug, but does not contain its active
ingredient. Placebos are used during drug trials to determine if the differences observed
by the patient are due to the medication or to the power of suggestion. Id.
115. Furmansky, supra note 68, at 112.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 113.
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could essentially destroy the possibility of having a control group in TND
trials, thereby ending the IND process after Phase 1.119 Therefore, the safety
and efficacy of the IND would never be determined. 12  Moreover, without
being able to determine whether the drug is ultimately safe and effective, the
entire operating mandate of the FDA would be compromised.'21
Because the expected success rate of cancer drugs at the Phase I stage of
clinical testing is only six percent, 122 implementing Abigail Alliance's
proposed changes could expose terminally ill patients to the toxicity of many
unapproved treatments, with a very low rate of success.1 3 Although Abigail
Alliance's critics are mainly concerned about the safety of the unapproved
drugs, and specifically argue that they "would do more harm than good" by
"shortening the lives of patients already subsisting in a weakened state, or
adding to their suffering," 124 few terminally ill patients would object to these
effects if the drugs are ultimately proven to be effective.
Other than surgery, radiation and chemotherapy are the two primary
methods currently used to treat cancer. 125 Radiation therapy helps reduce thesize of tumors and attacks cancerous cells with the use of ionizing
119. Id.
120. Id.; see also discussion supra Part II.B.
121. See discussion supra Part II.A. This is one argument discussed in the amicus
brief filed in support of the FDA in advance of the March 1, 2007, D.C. Court of Appeals
oral arguments. Brief for the American Society of Clinical Oncology, supra note 110, at
20. In support of the FDA, ASCO proposed that the Constitution does not guarantee the
right to access unapproved medications, and that the Abigail Alliance case threatens the
clinical trial enterprise. Id.
122. Peter D. Jacobson & Wendy E. Parmet, A New Era of Unapproved Drugs: The
Case of Abigail Alliance v. Von Eschenbach, 297 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 205, 206 (2007).
123. Soc'y for Clinical Trials Bd. of Dirs., The Society for Clinical Trials Opposes
U.S. Legislation to Permit Marketing of Unproven Medical Therapies for Seriously Ill
Patients, 3 CLINICAL TRIALS 154, 156 (2006); Furmansky supra note 68, at 113. See also
Jacobson & Parmet, supra note 122, at 206 (noting that only five percent of all cancer
drugs beginning clinical trials are ultimately approved for use and that less than a third
advance from Phase II to Phase III).
124. Furmansky, supra note 68, at 113.
125. National Cancer Institute, Types of Treatment, http://www.cancer.gov/
cancertopics/treatment/types-of-treatment (last visited Oct. 29, 2008).
Abigail Alliance v. Von Eschenbach
radiation, 26 while chemotherapy1 uses a combination of drugs to stop or slow
the growth of cancerous cells. While both treatments have the potential to
reduce pain by shrinking the size of some tumors, thereby lessening the
pressure on organs and nerves,1 28 they are also replete with side effects,
some of which can be very debilitating. 29 Although both radiation and
chemotherapy can successfully treat cancer, neither are guaranteed to
work. 130 Nevertheless, most cancer patients choose to undergo one or both
of these treatments, "since there is always the hope that they may be among
the lucky ones for whom treatment succeeds."'
131
126. National Cancer Institute, Radiation Therapy for Cancer: Questions and
Answers, http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/factsheet/therapy/radiation (last visited
Oct. 18, 2008).
127. American Cancer Society, Chemotherapy Effects, http://www.cancer.org/
docroot/MBC/MBC 2X ChemotherapyEffects.asp?sitearea &level = (last visited Oct.
17, 2008).
128. Cancer-Pain.org, Cancer Pain Treatments: Radiation and Chemotherapy,
http://www.cancer-pain.org/treatments/radiation.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2008).
129. Id. Side effects of radiation may include skin redness and skin irritation. Id.
Side effects of chemotherapy include, among others, hair loss, fatigue, mouth sores,
neuropathy, constipation, diarrhea, nausea and vomiting. Id.; American Nutrition Center,
Chemotherapy and Radiation Therapy Side Effects, http://www.naturalvigor.coml
chemol.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2008).
130. National Cancer Institute, What is Cancer?, http://www.cancer.gov/
cancertopics/what-is-cancer (last visited Oct. 17, 2008). For example, radiation and
chemotherapy are generally ineffective in treating liver cancer. University of Florida
News, UF Researchers Find Transplantation Effective for Some Liver Cancer Patients
(May 31, 2001), available at http://news.ufl.edu/2001/05/3l/liver/. Additionally, many
breast cancer patients opt for chemotherapy treatment, despite the fact that it has a less
than five percent chance of raising their survival odds. Online Lawyer Source, Chemo
Causes More Harm to Breast Cancer Patients (Aug. 21, 2006), http://www.online
lawyersource.com/news/chemo-harm-patients.html. For further information regarding
which breast cancer patients should receive chemotherapy based on their prognoses, see
generally Monica Morrow & Helen Krontiras, Who Should Not Receive Chemotherapy?
Data From American Databases and Trials, 30 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. MONOGRAPHS,
109 (2001).
131. Merrill Goozner, GoozNews, On the High Price of Cancer Drugs (July 28,
2007), http://www.gooznews.com/archives/000764.html.
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Terminally ill patients may utilize this same method of risk-analysis when
faced with an experimental new drug. However, because granting early
access to these drugs can potentially halt the approval process, it is not in a
patient's best interest to do that, only to receive a drug that has absolutely no
chance of working. Therefore, putting the safety issue aside, it is
nevertheless important to keep the FDA approval process relatively intact in
order to determine whether the experimental drug will, at a minimum,
effectively treat the illness for which it is designed.
B. Expedited Review as an Alternative to Early Access
While the Abigail Alliance argues mainly for expanded access,133
Congress could alternatively pass a law forcing the FDA to expedite the
approval process as a whole. Because the court of appeals' en bane decision
stands as the current law, an expedited approval process would nevertheless
enable terminally ill patients to access drug therapies sooner than they would
be able to under the FDA's current system.
1. Expedited Review Programs: The Beginning
Since the late 1980's, Congress has promoted initiatives to accelerate the
FDA approval process. 134 In 1987, in response to the AIDS epidemic, the
FDA created the "AA" priority category for potential AIDS therapies to
ensure that these drugs receive the highest priority in the review process.
135
132. For a further analysis on deregulation, see Clayton R. Portell, Live or Let Die:
Will the Courts Recognize in Terminally Ill Patients a Fundamental Right to Choose
Non-FDA Approved Drugs Or Does the FDA 's Stringent Approval Process Carry
Sufficient Merit?, 5 IND. HEALTH L. REv. 123, 134-144 (2008).
133. See Alliance III, 495 F.3d at 697 (addressing the question as to "whether the
Constitution provides terminally ill patients a right of access to experimental drugs that
have passed limited safety trials but have not been proven safe and effective"). The
Alliance essentially argues for access after Phase I, and this is the same argument made in
their Petition for Writ of Certiorari. See generally id.; Petition for Writ of Certiorari at ii,
Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Eschenbach, No. 07-444
(2008).
134. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Expanded Access and Expedited Approval
of New Therapies Related to HIV/AIDS, http://www.fda.gov/oashi/aids/expanded.html
(last visited Oct. 17, 2008) [hereinafter HIV/AIDS Expanded Access, Accelerated
Approvals]. These expedited approvals were designed to expand access to HIV and
AIDS therapies, but most seem to apply to any new drug therapy for the treatment of a
terminal illness in general. Id.
135. Id.
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Additionally, in 1988, the FDA issued interim regulations that allowed for
the expedited marketing approval of new drugs directly from Phase 11.136 In
order for these drugs to receive expedited marketing approval, the FDA must
make a medical risk-benefit judgment, "tak[ing] into consideration the
severity of the disease [the IND is designed to treat], and the absence of
satisfactory alternative therapy."'137 According to the FDA, these "Subpart E
regulations" were promulgated to "expedite the development, evaluation,
and marketing of promising therapies to treat individuals with life-
threatening and severely debilitating illnesses.,
138
In 1992, the FDA developed "Accelerated Approval Regulations"' 39 for
new drug and biological products that have been studied "for their safety and
effectiveness in treating serious or life-threatening illnesses and that provide
meaningful therapeutic benefit to patients over existing treatments (e.g.,
ability to treat patients unresponsive to, or intolerant of, available therapy, or
improved patient response over available therapy)." 140 Under these
provisions, the FDA may approve drugs based on "surrogate endpoints' ' 14'
that reasonably predict that a drug provides clinical benefit."' 142 Eventually,
this "clinical benefit" is confirmed through additional human testing.
143
However, because the drug has received marketing approval beforehand, it
136. 21 C.F.R. § 312.80 (2000).
137. 21 C.F.R. § 312.84 (2000). "Under Subpart E regulations for investigational new
drugs, drug development is considered a continuum from early preclinical and clinical
studies through submission of a marketing application." HIV/AIDS Expanded Access,
Accelerated Approvals, supra note 134.
138. HIV/AIDS Expanded Access, Accelerated Approvals, supra note 134.
139. Id.
140. 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.500, 601.40. See also HIV/AIDS Expanded Access,
Accelerated Approvals, supra note 134.
141. People Living with Cancer, Part II: Drug Development and Approval,
http://www.cancer.net/patient/Library/Cancer.net+Features/Clinical+Trials+and+
Research/ci.Part+l l%3A+Drug+Development+and+Approval (last visited Oct. 17,
2008). Surrogate endpoints are "indirect measures of disease status, such as an
improvement in disease-related symptoms or a change in laboratory results." Id.
142. HlV/AIDS Expanded Access, Accelerated Approvals, supra note 134.
143. Id.
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is still available to terminally ill patients much earlier than they would
normally receive it. 144 If these studies later show that there is in fact no
clinical benefit, the drug will then be removed from the market. 
145
That same year, Congress enacted the Prescription Drug User Fee Act
(PDUFA). 14 PDUFA was established to increase FDA funding for human
drug review,1 47 which in turn would increase the speed and predictability of
the review process "by reaching back through the regulatory timeline to
reduce unnecessary friction and uncertainty in the much longer TND-NDA
period." 148  According to the FDA, that Act requires "the U.S.
pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries [to] pay user fees [to the
Agency]," that would then use the added funds "to hire additional reviewers
and support staff, as well as upgrade its information technology systems.'
149
This Act allowed the FDA to develop a more standardized process with
faster, more predictable review timeframes, thereby speeding up the
application review process for new drugs and biological products without
compromising the FDA's high standards for approval.
2. 1997: A Year for Change ... Potentially
In 1997, the FDA announced two more expedited review programs. First,
the FDA launched its "Fast Track Drug Development Programs."'151 These
programs are designed to "facilitate the development and expedite the
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Food and Drug Admin., WHITE PAPER, PRESCRIPTION DRUG USER FEE ACT
(PDUFA): ADDING RESOURCES AND IMPROVING PERFORMANCE IN FDA REVIEW OF NEW
DRUG APPLICATIONS 1, 4 (2005), http://www.fda.gov/oc/pdufa/PDUFAWhitePaper.pdf
[hereinafter WHITE PAPER].
147. Id. at 1.
148. The Bernstein Report on BioBusiness, Deconstructing FDAMA, BIOCENTURY,
(photo. reprint 2007), at 1, available at http://www.arighttolive.org/FDAMA.pdf
[hereinafter BIOCENTURY].
149. WHITE PAPER, supra note 146, at 4.
150. Id.
151. HIV/AIDS Expanded Access, Accelerated Approvals, supra note 134.
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review of new drugs that are intended to treat serious or life-threatening
conditions and that demonstrate the potential to address unmet medical
needs."'1 52  The Fast Track program plans to accomplish this goal by
providing "formal mechanisms for sponsors to [be able to] communicate
with the FDA on product development issues. Additionally, "products
accepted into the Fast Track program can have portions of their drug
approval or biologics licensing applications ... submitted to the FDA before
the application is complete." Once the sponsor files a complete
application, the result is an early review, which can significantly shorten the
time required for approval.
155
To enhance the Fast Track programs, Congress passed the Food and Drug
Administration and Modernization Act of 1997 ("FDAMA"), 156 which
directed the FDA "to issue guidance describing its policies and procedures
pertaining to fast track products."'157 Section 112 of the FDAMA amended
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act by adding section 506, which
authorizes the FDA to take appropriate action to "facilitate the development
and expedite the review" of fast track drugs.1 59 Specifically, the FDAMA
152. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, FDA, GUIDANCE FOR
INDUSTRY: FAST TRACK DRUG DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS: DESIGNATION, DEVELOPMENT,
AND APPLICATION REvIEW (2004), http://www.fda.gov/cder/guidance/5645fnl.pdf
[hereinafter GUIDANCE]. The Guidance defined an unmet medical need as a "medical
need that is not addressed adequately by an existing therapy." Id. at 6.
153. Patricia Kaeding, FDA Programs Encourage and Expedite Drug Development
and Approval, WISCONSIN TECHNOLOGY NETWORK, Dec. 14, 2005,
http://wistechnology.com/articles/2545/. Clinical trial design is one example of a product
development issue with which the sponsor may want the FDA's assistance. Id.
154. Id. INDs that are not in the Fast Track program also have the opportunity to
consult with the FDA on these matters, but they do not have the added benefit of having
their applications prematurely approved. Id.
155. Id.
156. Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115,
111 Stat. 2296 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 356 (1997)).
157. GUIDANCE, supra note 152, at 2.
158. 21 U.S.C. § 356 (2000).
159. GUIDANCE, supra note 152, at 2.
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codified the aforementioned Accelerated Approval Regulations,' G° and
allowed for NDAs to be submitted to the FDA before the application is
complete, as is allowed under the Fast Track programs.161
The FDAMA was intended to surpass the PDUFA, which addressed only
the "review phase" of the FDA approval process, to "streamline early drug
development phase as well."' 162  In fact, the passage of the FDAMA
prompted the FDA to legally change their mission from "protecting
Americans from impure, unsafe or ineffective products" to also include the
new responsibility of advancing public health by "approving new drugs and
devices rapidly and efficiently."' 63 However, as evidenced by the Provenge
controversy,164 the FDA has nevertheless continued on a decelerated
approval initiative over the past ten years. 165 In fact, rather then overhauling
the approval process to "refocus attention on getting new therapies to
patients more efficiently,"'' 66 the FDA has decelerated the approval process
by increasing its standards and requirements for cancer drug approvals in
three ways. 167  First, the FDA currently demands greater trial response
rates. 168 Second, it requires candidates vying for the accelerated approval
process to compete against off-label indications for its medications.'
69
Finally, the FDA requires ongoing concurrent confirmatory trials at the time
of approval. 170
160. Id.; see discussion supra Part IV.B.1.
161. GUIDANCE, supra note 152, at 3.
162. BIOCENTURY, supra note 148, at 2 (quoting Sen. Barbara Mikulski).
163. Id. at 1.
164. See discussion supra Part I.





170. Id. at 3.
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On September 27, 2007, Congress enacted the Food and Drug
Administration Amendments Act of 2007 (FDAAA),"7 which changed a
number of areas of FDA regulation. 172 Notably, the new law demands that
sponsors have a "risk evaluation and mitigation strategy" that requires the
sponsor to reduce risks when necessary, to ensure that a drug's benefits
outweigh its risks. 173 Although the FDAAA includes the reauthorization and
expansion of the PDUFA, including "facilitat[ing] more efficient
development of safe and effective new medications for the American
public," it emphasizes expanding the FDA's authority in order to "broaden
and upgrade the agency's drug safety program."' 174 With an increased focus
on safety, the FDAAA will likely slow down the drug approval process even
more, despite its efforts to act efficiently.
3. Passing the ACCESS Act: An Important Step in Expediting
Approval
Clearly, the accelerated approval programs currently in place are not
achieving their desired effects with respect to expediting the approval
process. With regard to this issue, Senator Brownback of Kansas has been
working with the Alliance to pass what has become known as the ACCESS
Act - Access, Compassion, Care and Ethics for Seriously Ill Patients. 175 The
ACCESS Act creates a new approval mechanism called Compassionate
Investigational Access (CIA), where "terminally ill patients whose medical
needs are unmet by currently available options would be granted access to
promising, investigational treatments that have shown evidence that the
treatment may be effective against a serious illness considering the risk to
171. Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85,
110 Stat. 823 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2007)).
172. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Law Strengthens FDA, http://www.fda.gov/
oc/initiatives/advance/fdaaa.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2008).
173. Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, at § 901(a), § 355-
l(p), 121 Stat. 823, 926-39.
174. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Prescription Drug User Fees,
http://www.fda.gov/oc /pdufa/default.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2008).
175. S. 1956, 109th Cong. (2005), available at http://www.abigail-alliance.org/BILL
ACCESS Ac S19561S-_.pdf.
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the patient from the disease.' 76 According to The Wall Street Journal, in
order to receive a CIA drug, a patient
must suffer from a serious or life-threatening disease, be out of
approved options and unable to gain access to a clinical trial, provide
informed consent, and allow the collection of clinical data from their
experience with the drug so we will all know more about the safety
and efficacy of new therapies before they are approved for wider
177
use.
The Act also has an "Accelerated Approval level," which "improves the
existing system, [by] allow[ing] patients with life-threatening diseases
access to treatments that have shown effectiveness upon completion of
Phase II clinical trials." 178 In passing the ACCESS Act, Congress could
finally send a clear message to the FDA regarding its intent to accelerate the
approval process for treatments for the terminally ill. Not only will this Act
enable Congress to demonstrate its clear intent on this subject, it will also
help disseminate any damage to the approval process that the D.C. Court of
Appeals' en banc decision may have had. 179 However, given the way the
FDA has disregarded past legislative efforts to speed up the approval process
in the name of safety, it is unlikely that a further legislative initiative will
have the desired effect of expanding access. In order to develop a
responsive solution to this problem, it is necessary to analyze why the FDA
has an incentive to slow down the approval process.
176. FDA Law Blog, ACCESS Act Reintroduced by Sen. Brownback; Previous
Tiered Approval Nomenclature Scrapped and New Immunity Provision Added,
http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda law blog hyman phelps/2008/06/access-act-rein.html
(last visited Oct. 18, 2008) [hereinafter FDA Law Blog].
177. Steven Walker & Ronald Trowbridge, Op-Ed., How the Senate Can Help Ted
Kennedy, WALL ST. J., Jun. 11, 2008, at A23, available at http://online.wsj.com/
article email/SB 121314183727362033-1MyQjAxMDI4MTEzMDExNDAxWj.html.
178. FDA Law Blog, supra note 176.
179. For a further analysis of the ACCESS Act, see Leibfarth, supra note 108, at
1309-16.
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IV. WHY THE FDA HAS AN INCENTIVE TO DELAY THE INTRODUCTION OF
NEW DRUGS
Slowing down the FDA review process is devastating to the terminally ill
patients whose lives depend on efficient review.8 ° While the FDA has
seemingly focused on "raising the efficacy bar," 181 it has not done so with
the intent to cause harm to those who could benefit from these potentially
lifesaving treatments. Rather, its commitment towards efficacy stems from
the fact that it is the FDA who receives the blame when approved drugs later
reveal themselves to pose even more serious risks than the disease the drugs
were initially approved to treat. 18 2 When an approved drug is later found to
be unsafe, the backlash and liability imposed upon the FDA is often
severe. 183 For example, Rofecoxib, marketed under the trade name Vioxx,
gained widespread acceptance among physicians treating patients with
arthritis and other conditions causing chronic or acute pain. However, on
September 30, 2004, Merck voluntarily withdrew Vioxx from the market
due to concerns regarding the increased risk of heart attack and stroke
associated with the long-term, high-dosage use of this drug.1 85 According to
an FDA study, during its five years on the U.S. market, Vioxx caused
between 88,000 and 139,000 heart attacks, thirty to forty percent of which
were fatal.
186
180. See generally FDAReview.org, Why the FDA has an Incentive to Delay the
Introduction of New Drugs, http://www.fdareview.org/incentives.shtml (last visited Oct.
17, 2008) [hereinafter FDA Review].
181. BIOCENTURY,supra note 148, at 3.
182. FDA Review, supra note 180.
183. See U.S. Food and Drug Administration, COX-2 Selective (includes Bextra,
Celebrex, and Vioxx) and Non-Selective Non-Steroidal Anti-Inflammatory Drugs
(NSAIDs), http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/infopage/COX2/default.htm (last visited Oct.
17, 2008).
184. Id.
185. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, FDA Public Health Advisory: Safety of
Vioxx, http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/infopage/vioxx/PHA-vioxx.htm (last visited Oct.
17, 2008).
186. Terry Carter, The Preemption Prescription, ABA JOURNAL, Nov. 2008, at 46.
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This controversy resulted in numerous lawsuits.' s 7 Most recently, on
November 9, 2007, Merck & Co., Inc. agreed to pay 4.85 billion dollars in
settlement. Additionally, the Vioxx controversy affected the FDA
directly; there are new "restrictions on outside experts who sit on FDA
advisory panels while having financial ties to the drug industry."18 9
On the other hand, the consequences of delayed approval are not nearly as
damaging to the FDA. 19° Most patients who request 1NDs are acting in an
individual capacity and their voices are not heard.191 Groups like the Abigail
Alliance are rare, and even in circumstances involving vocal groups, the
"heat" imposed on the FDA "is not extreme because the FDA officials can
always claim that they are simply doing their job in delaying the approval of
experimental drugs." 192 Furthermore, "[n]o one who could counter such
claims would be in a position to do so. Thus, the bad consequences of
disallowing the drug would not be identifiable and would not revisit the
FDA." 193  This provides the FDA with a hefty incentive to delay the
introduction of new drugs.
194
Part of this problem lies in the media attention given to the issue. For
example, "[w]hen the side effects of a new drug cause little Tommy of 236
Elm Street, Saginaw, Michigan, to become gravely ill, television reporters
show the poor lad languishing in a hospital bed, and viewers respond
emotionally. When little Tommy dies, reporters interview the grieving
187. See Vioxx (Rofecoxib) Information Center, Litigation Information,
http://www.merck.com/newsroom/vioxx (last visited Oct. 17, 2008).
188. Lewis Krauskopf, Merck Agrees to Pay $4.85 Billion in Vioxx Settlement,
Reuters (Nov. 9, 2007), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/
idUSL0929726620071109.
189. Carter, supra note 186, at 46.




194. FDA Review, supra note 180.
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parents."'195 The internet has heightened this effect, as the public now has
almost instant access to this information.' 96 According to the Independent
Institute, "FDA reviewers are anxious to avoid such censure, which might
damage their careers and reputations."' 197  The result is a "hold" on these
potentially life-saving drugs.
198
V. MORE DISINCENTIVES JN THE NOT-SO-DISTANT FUTURE
On December 13, 2007, Congressman Mike Michaud (D-ME) and his
colleagues, Congressmen Dan Burton (R-IN) and Tim Ryan (D-OH), called
on the House Energy and Commerce Committee to conduct a hearing to
examine the conflict of interests governing the FDA and its recent decision
rejecting the licensure of Provenge.199 Apparently, the restrictions placed on
the FDA advisory panels as a result of the Vioxx litigation were not a
sufficient remedy, because "[t]he bipartisan letter requests that the Energy
and Commerce Committee hold a hearing to examine possible ethical
violations of these panel members considering the viability of potentially
important life-saving drugs." 200  Michaud's main concern related to the
"ethical" issues regarding the two panelists who voted against approval; he
stated "I believe that the FDA should not be appointing scientists leading the
testing of a rival drug for another firm onto an advisory committee
evaluating Provenge .. .I believe a full disclosure is necessary in order to
restore confidence in the FDA."
20 1
195. FDA Review, supra note 180. "Little Tommy" and his family might even appear
on Oprah. Id.
196. "A cardiothoracic surgeon told me that if there is an adverse event anywhere in
the world on Monday, they all know about it on Tuesday." Carter, supra note 186, at 47
(quoting Richard Epstein).
197. FDA Review, supra note 180.
198. Id.
199. Press Release, A Right to Live for Cancer Patients, Michaud Calls for Hearing
on Potential Life-saving Prostate Cancer Drug (Dec. 13, 2007),
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However, it is clear that the FDA needs more than full disclosure to solve
the problem behind the slowdown of the drug approval process. Because
treatments for terminal illnesses are usually the most complicated and have
the highest risk of negative side effects, regulation is needed but delays must
be addressed. There are merits to having an extensively regulated drug
approval process, namely safety; however, in the case of terminally ill
patients, who face a certain and sometimes immediate death, after FDA-
approved options have been exhausted, the fact that an experimental drug
may not be wholly safe becomes irrelevant. 202  While accelerating the
approval process would avoid problems presented by early approval, no
legislation, including the ACCESS Act, will be effective when the FDA has
an incentive to maintain the approval process at a slow rate.
What is needed is tort reform allowing the FDA to waive or limit liability
under circumstances where terminally ill patients with informed consent,
request drugs that have not yet completed the full approval process.
However, whether or not this is possible depends on how the Supreme Court
decides Wyeth v. Levine.203 In this case, Levine, a professional guitarist,
sued the drug manufacturer, Wyeth, for failing to provide a strong enough
warning regarding the risks of injecting its drug Phenergen, an anti-nausea
medication, after her arm was amputated as a result of an "IV push" of the
drug into her artery.204 The argument before the Supreme Court centers on
the issue of preemption; "Whether [the FDA] approval of a prescription
drug's labeling preempts state-law failure-to-warn claims in the absence of
any express preemption provision in the [FDCA] . ,205 While Levine
thinks Wyeth should be held liable for the inadequate warning, "Wyeth
argued, and the FDA agreed in a amicus brief, that the FDA-approved label
was adequate and that the company could not, and should not, make changes
to the label on its own."
20 6
202. See discussion, supra Part IV.A (referring to the side effects of radiation and
chemotherapy).
203. Wyeth v. Levine, 77 USLW 3196 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2008)(No. 06-1249).
204. Carter, supra note 186, at 46-47; Brief for Respondent at 1, Wyeth v. Levine, 77
USLW 3196 (U.S. Oct. 6,2008) (No. 06-1249).
205. Brief for Respondent at i, Wyeth v. Levine, 77 USLW 3196 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2008)
(No. 06-1249).
206. Carter, supra note 186, at 47 (emphasis added).
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CONCLUSION
The Court's ruling in Wyeth has the potential to provide the FDA with an
even greater incentive to slow down the approval process, depending on how
the case is decided. Although this case centers on the FDA's preemption of
drug labeling, the arguments stem from the absence of a preemption
provision in the FDCA. If the Court concludes that the FDA's approval of a
drug's labeling preempts state law failure-to-warn claims, this holding could
be expanded to reflect that the FDA preempts the entire area of drug
approval. If the FDA claims sole responsibility for drug labeling, and
potentially drug and medical device safety as a whole, this expanded liability
will provide the FDA with an even greater incentive to slow down the drug
approval process. If the Abigail Alliance decision was not the end of the
road, Wyeth very well could be.
